Abstract. This paper proves the existence of a stationary distribution for a class of Markov voting models. We assume that alternatives to replace the current status quo arise probabilisticaUy, with the probability distribution at time t + 1 having support set equal to the set of alternatives that defeat, according to some voting rule, the current status quo at time t. When preferences are based on Euclidean distance, it is shown that for a wide class of voting rules, a limiting distribution exists. For the special case of majority rule, not only does a limiting distribution always exist, but we obtain bounds for the concentration of the limiting distribution around a centrally located set. The implications are that under Markov voting models, small deviations from the conditions for a core point will still leave the limiting distribution quite concentrated around a generalized median point. Even though the majority relation is totally cyclic in such situations, our results show that such chaos is not probabilistically significant.
Introduction
It is becoming increasingly evident that nondeterministic models of individual and group behavior have an important role to play in the social sciences. Such models can provide relief from impossibility results, and may yield equilibria not generally present in deterministic formulations. In the realm of game-theoretic models of committee voting there are an abundance of solution concepts, but none are fully adequate in that they can often fail to make a prediction (equilibria do not exist) or they predict indiscriminately (the set of solutions is unworkably large). Nondeterministic solutions, on the other hand, afford the possibility of always existing while discriminating probabilistically over any set of possible outcomes. In addition, probabilistic solutions may reduce to nondeterministic solutions when the latter do exist and are appropriate.
A natural and widely applicable means of generating probabilistic predictions is provided by Markov processes. For voters making a choice from a finite set of J. A. Ferejohn et al. alternatives, a finite state discrete time Markov chain model of sequential voting is developed by Ferejohn et al. (1980) . When the alternatives form a compact subset of N m, a continuous state Markov process can be used to generate a probabilistic solution concept (Packel 1981) . Each of these models assumes that alternatives to replace the current status quo arise probabilistically, with the probability distribution of time t + 1 having support equal to the set of alternatives that defeat (by some voting rule) the current status quo at time t. Once this probability distribution is obtained, one can then try to determine the limiting distribution (i.e., the steady state probabilities) for the Markov process. For a finite set of alternatives, this procedure is straightforward. When alternatives are a general subset of N", a number of interesting and important questions arise about the existence and structure of the limiting distribution. In this paper we formulate and address these questions.
When the alternative space is compact and voter preferences are "reasonable", it is shown in Packel (1981) that a limiting probability distribution must exist and will be concentrated at the strong equilibrium if such an equilibrium exists. In the absence of an equilibrium, however, one would like to know to what extent the distribution is concentrated in the Pareto set or some other centrally located region in the alternative space.
If we allow the alternative space to be all of IR", additional subtleties arise. When m > 2, a result by McKelvey (1976 McKelvey ( , 1979 shows that for almost all distributions of voter preferences, any point in N ~ can be reached from any other point by a finite sequence of majority rule votes. See also Schofield (1980 Schofield ( , 1983 , who proves similar results for general social choice functions. These results suggest that any of the following disjoint conclusions might plausibly hold: (c) The limiting distribution will exist and have most of its probability near some centrally located region in the Pareto set.
As we show in the final section, both (a) and (b) may occur if some contrived assumptions are made about the support sets for the transition probabilities. However, under more reasonable assumptions about the transition probabilities, and assuming circular preferences for the voters, we show that a limiting distribution must always exist. This is true regardless of the structure of the decisive coalitions which generate the social preference relation -even, for example, if the underlying game is not proper. We can also obtain some weak bounds on the limiting probability distribution of such a process and its relation to the Pareto set.
In the special case of majority rule, we get much stronger results. Here we not only get existence of the limiting distribution, but we can bound the limiting distribution in terms of its concentrations around a more centrally located set. It follows from the results here that if the distribution of voter ideal points is "close" to symmetric, i.e. if it is close the situation when a core exists, then the limiting distribution will be quite concentrated near a "generalized median." Even when there is less symmetry, the distribution will be concentrated around a centrally located region which for large numbers of voters will be contained in the Pareto set and will also contain Kramer's minimax set. Thus, the class of probabilistic solution concepts we consider are consis-
